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I. INTRODUCTION
The expression, "a man's home is his castle," embodies one of the
most cherished individual liberties in American society, the right to en-
joy privacy and freedom from unreasonable government intrusion in the
confines of one's home.' Recognizing the importance of this right, the
1. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (recognizing "the right of a man to
retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"); see also infra
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first Senate adopted the fourth amendment,2 which protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
3
Initially, the United States Supreme Court narrowly construed the
fourth amendment as protecting only physical intrusions of persons,
houses, papers, and effects. 4 Later, the Court expanded coverage of the
fourth amendment to include the area immediately adjacent to the
home5 and used in connection with it.6 This area is referred to as the
curtilage7 and for fourth amendment purposes is considered part of the
home itself.8 The curtilage does not extend to distant areas that could
notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
2. The original version of the fourth amendment indicated that the Framers were primarily
concerned about overreaching warrants, not warrantless searches. The Senate, however, adopted
the present version. See Note, California v. Ciraolo: The Demise of Private Property, 47 LA. L.
REV. 1365, 1366 (1987). For a discussion of the history of the fourth amendment, see generally T.
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); and Reynard, Freedom from Un-
reasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1950).
3. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states by incorporation through
the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
4. See Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the
Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 715 (1985) (stating that "[ilnitially,
the Court relied heavily upon the restrictive terminology of the fourth amendment,. . . thus 'indi-
cat[ing] with some precision the places and things encompassed by its protections'" (brackets in
original) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984))).
5. In Oliver the Court determined that a marijuana patch a mile away from the defendant's
home was not within the curtilage of the home, but rather was in the open fields. Oliver, 466 U.S.
at 178-80. In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the Court applied four factors to deter-
mine whether a barn fell within the curtilage: "(1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2)
whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which
the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
passers-by." Id. at 294-95. The Court held that a barn was not within the curtilage when it was
isolated from the home, was not enclosed within the same fence as the home, did not objectively
appear to be used for intimate activities associated with the home, and had not been protected
from observation. Id. at 295.
6. See 1 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2(c) (1984 & Supp. 1989).
7. Black's Law Dictionary defines curtilage as "[tihe inclosed space of ground and buildings
immediately surrounding a dwellinghouse." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979). The term
is derived from Latin and French:
The word curtilage is derived from the Latin cohors (a place enclosed around a yard) and the
old French cortillage or courtilage which today has been corrupted into courtyard. Originally
it referred to the land and outbuildings immediately adjacent to a castle that were in turn
surrounded by a high stone wall.
United States v. Romano, 388 F. Supp. 101, 104 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The Supreme Court has
defined the curtilage as "the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanc-
tity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'" Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 225 (1902).
8. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
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be considered open fields,9 which are not protected under the fourth
amendment10 because they do not harbor the intimate activities that
the fourth amendment is intended to protect from governmental inter-
ference or surveillance. 11
In recent years the increased use of aircraft by government officials
to detect illegal activity in areas obstructed from view at ground level 2
has threatened to reduce the amount of privacy traditionally enjoyed in
the curtilages of personal residences. In California v. Ciraolo5 the
Court adopted a restrictive view of the amendment's protections, hold-
ing that police do not need a warrant to search curtilage areas from the
air as long as the police operate at a legal altitude. 14 Last term, in Flor-
ida v. Riley,15 a plurality of the Court affirmed the Ciraolo standard. 6
Significantly, however, Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the judg-
ment, and four dissenting justices determined that the proper stan-
dard to be applied in aerial surveillance cases should focus on the
frequency of public flights at the altitude at which the officials were
operating, rather than on whether the altitude was within legal limits. 8
This Recent Development examines the development of the curti-
lage doctrine to its present status. Part II examines the development of
fourth amendment protection, particularly Katz v. United States,9 in
which the Court determined that the scope of fourth amendment pro-
tection is governed by reference to objectively reasonable expectations
of privacy.20 Part II also analyzes the aerial surveillance standards of
California v. Ciraolo.21 Part III examines the recent decision of Florida
v. Riley and compares the various opinions in the case. Finally, Part IV
advocates a new standard to be applied to cases involving aerial surveil-
lance of residential curtilages.
9. Id. at 178 (contending that "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activ-
ities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home").
10. Id. at 179.
11. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179).
12. See Zeese, Aerial Searches for Marijuana, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 33 (1982) (report-
ing that thousands of aerial searches have been conducted in the United States since the late
1970s).
13. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
14. Id. at 215.
15. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (plurality decision); see infra notes 114-58 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 697 (plurality opinion).
17. Justice Brennan authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Stevens and
Marshall. Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent. Id. at
705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 699 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 705-06
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
21. 476 U.S. at 207.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment has been both praised for its brevity and
criticized for its ambiguity. 2 It does not define "unreasonable" nor does
it define the relationship between the first clause, which proscribes un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and the second clause, which sets
forth the requirements for the issuance of warrants.23 Furthermore, un-
like the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment makes no mention of
excluding evidence obtained in contravention of its provisions.24
To discern the Framers' intent, the Supreme Court has construed
the amendment as declaring unreasonable all searches conducted with-
out a warrant,25 unless conducted pursuant to one of the explicitly es-
tablished and well-defined exceptions.2" Evidence obtained in violation
of this rule must be excluded at tria2 7 in an effort to deter police abuse
and maintain judicial integrity.2 8
Whether the amendment applies in any given circumstance inher-
ently depends upon the meaning attached to the limiting words "search
and seizure. '29 Unless the government has conducted a "search or
seizure," the amendment's protection against unreasonable intrusion
does not apply.30 The meaning attached to these words, therefore, gov-
erns the reach of the amendment and reflects society's current balance
of an individual's right of privacy and security against the government's
interest in detecting and preventing crime.31
22. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966).
23. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a)
(1987).
24. Id.
25. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (stating that "[i]t is first a principle of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they first con-
vince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so").
26. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
28. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n.10 (1968) (asserting that "it is not
deterrence alone that warrants the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained-it is 'the imperative of
judicial integrity'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1961))); see also Mapp,
367 U.S. at 659.
29. See Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging Tripar-
tite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1078 n.3 (1987).
30. See Note, supra note 2, at 1367.
31. Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment Protection Af-
ter Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 709 (1977).
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A. Constitutionally Protected Areas and the Physical Trespass
Doctrine
Initially, the Supreme Court defined the term "search" in light of
English property rights and tort law.3 2 The amendment was held to ap-
ply only when there was a physical trespass of "constitutionally pro-
tected areas."38 These areas were never clearly defined, but apparently
were intended to include those places, such as the home, which society
expected to remain private and free from government intrusion.34 In
addition, the Court extended protection to the curtilage, which is an
area closely allied with the home. 5
Property beyond the home and curtilage received no protection
under the fourth amendment, even when a trespass occurred. In Hester
v. United States"8 two revenue agents entered land belonging to Hes-
ter's father without a warrant.3 7 From a secluded vantage point, the
agents observed Hester conduct a sale of illegal liquor.3 When the
agents made their presence known, Hester fled and dropped a bottle of
liquor taken from a nearby car. 9 The agents confiscated the bottle and
it was admitted into evidence at trial.40 The Court rejected Hester's
fourth amendment defense, holding that the fourth amendment's pro-
tection of persons, homes, and personal effects does not extend to the
open fields."
The Court first articulated the distinction between the curtilage
and open fields in Olmstead v. United States, while also clearly defin-
ing the limits of the fourth amendment in terms of the physical tres-
pass of a protected area.'2 In that case, four prohibition officers tapped
telephone wires leading to Olmstead's phone.' 3 The taps had been in-
stalled where the telephone wires passed over a public street in order to
32. Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455,
462 n.34 (1984); see also Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765) (permitting a trespass
action for breaking and entering Entick's home pursuant to an invalidly authorized search
warrant).
33. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257,
266 n.64 (1984). See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
34. Wasserstrom, supra note 33, at 266 n.64.
35. See supra note 7.
36. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
37. Id. at 58.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 59. The Court held that "the special protection afforded by the Fourth Amend-
ment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields.
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." Id.
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
43. Id. at 456-57.
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avoid physical intrusion of Olmstead's property." Through the taps,
the officers overheard conversations implicating Olinstead in a conspir-
acy to buy and distribute liquor in violation of the National Prohibition
Act.45 The Court refused to exclude evidence of the conversations as the
product of an unconstitutional search because the evidence was ob-
tained without any physical trespass of protected property.46 The Court
held that Olmstead could not invoke the fourth amendment because
there had been no official search and seizure of his papers or tangible
property and no physical intrusion into his house or curtilage.4 Because
the wiretap had been affixed to the telephone lines beyond the pro-
tected areas of Olmstead's house and curtilage, no search occurred
withh the meaning of the fourth amendment.48 Interpreted together
with Hester, Olmstead limited the protection of the fourth amendment
to the boundaries of the curtilage.49
In 1960 the Court began to move away from the strict application
of property concepts in fourth amendment cases. In Silverman v.
United States50 District of Columbia police officers had suspected the
defendant of using a certain location as the headquarters for an illegal
gambling operation.5 1 The police had gained permission to use the va-
cant adjoining row house to observe Silverman's activities.52 After in-
serting a foot-long, spike microphone through the adjoining wall, the
police overheard conversations that incriminated Silverman. 3 Evidence
of the conversations was admitted at trial and played a substantial role
in Silverman's conviction.5 4
Silverman argued that the use of the spike microphone was uncon-
stitutional because the physical penetration of the wall was a trespass
of a protected area. The Court, however, refused to base its holding on
whether a technical trespass had occurred under local property laws,
determining that fourth amendment rights cannot be measured in
terms of the nuances of tort or real property law.5 Instead, the Court
reversed the conviction on the ground that the fourth amendment was
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 464.
47. Id. at 466.
48. Id.
49. See Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed Signifi-
cance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 795, 800
(1985).
50. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
51. Id. at 506.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 511.
[Vol. 43:275
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
designed to protect a basic concept of privacy, not a defined physical
area." Thus, although early Court decisions limited the protection of
the fourth amendment to houses and their immediately surrounding
area, Silverman indicated that the stage was set for expansion of the
fourth amendment beyond the strict limits of physical trespass.
B. Katz and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
In light of numerous advances in technology, the Court determined
in Katz v. United States57 that traditional trespass concepts could no
longer effectively guide fourth amendment analysis.5 8 The Court rede-
fined the scope of the amendment in terms of an individual's reasonable
expectations of privacy.
In Katz the defendant had been convicted of transmitting wagering
information across state lines in violation of a federal statute. 59 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had obtained incriminating evi-
dence by attaching an electronic listening device to the outside of a
public telephone booth that Katz had used to place his calls.6 0 The gov-
ernment argued that because there had been no physical penetration of
the phone booth, the fourth amendment did not prohibit introduction
of the evidence.6 1 Katz contended that the search violated the fourth
amendment because the telephone booth was a "constitutionally pro-
tected area."62
The Court rejected both of these contentions and looked instead to
the core of the amendment and determined that its purpose is to pro-
tect people, not places.6 Consequently, the Court held that incantation
of the phrase "constitutionally protected area" does not promote proper
application of the fourth amendment.64 The Court reasoned that items
which are knowingly exposed to the public cannot be protected by the
fourth amendment, even if they are within areas, such as the home,
which are traditionally protected. Conversely, the Court held that items
which a person attempts to protect as private may be within the scope
56. Id. (holding that the fourth amendment was intended to protect "the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion").
57. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58. For a discussion of the impact of modern technology, such as telephones, electronic lis-
tening devices, wiretaps, and electronic tracking devices on fourth amendment jurisprudence, see
Comment, Dow Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36
CATH. U.L. REV. 667 (1987).
59. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. The relevant federal statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1988).
60. Id. at 348.
61. Id. at 351-52.
62. Id. at 349.
63. Id. at 351.
64. Id.
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of the amendment, even if they are in areas that are accessible to the
public."5
The Court specifically overruled Olmstead,66 holding that even
though the FBI listening device did not physically penetrate the phone
booth, the telephone conversations were inadmissible. 7 Once Katz
closed the phone booth door behind him, he had a justifiable right to
believe that his conversation would be free from governmental
intrusion.68
The constitutional standard that has emerged from Katz was not
set forth in the majority opinion, however, but in Justice Harlan's con-
currence.6 9 Justice Harlan was concerned more with reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy than with justifiable ones. He set forth a two-prong test
to determine when a person has an expectation of privacy in an activity
that warrants constitutional protection. First, a person must have ex-
hibited an actual expectation of privacy, and second, the expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."°
Justice Harlan did not provide specific factors for determining
when an expectation of privacy will be considered to be reasonable. He
clearly agreed with the majority, however, that property-based distinc-
tions should no longer dictate the reach of the fourth amendment.71
The progeny of cases since Katz, however, has failed to follow the Katz
rationale, producing a resurgence of property-based distinctions in
fourth amendment jurisprudence.
C. The Supreme Court's Post-Katz Analysis: The Reemergence of
Property-Based Distinctions
In Oliver v. United States7 2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its hold-
ing in Hester that activities conducted in open fields are not protected
65. Id. (holding that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected" (citation
omitted)).
66. Id. at 353.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (applying Justice Harlan's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test for the first time).
70. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. Id. Justice Harlan noted that property interests became important because the protec-
tion of people was best accomplished by reference to a place. Id.
One commentator contends that Justice Harlan concurred in Katz because he wanted to re-
place completely the constitutionally protected areas test with a privacy test. The majority, on the
other hand, sought to evaluate the individual privacy interests in addition to analyzing the area in
question. See generally Comment, supra note 31.
72. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). See generally Comment, supra note 49.
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by the fourth amendment. In that case, two Kentucky state police of-
ficers had investigated Oliver's property after receiving a tip that Oliver
was cultivating marijuana.73 Oliver's property was fenced and marked
with a "No Trespassing" sign.7 ' The officers found a patch of marijuana
more than a mile away from Oliver's home, growing in an area of Oli-
ver's field that was completely secluded from public view by woods,
fences, and embankments. 5
Despite the seclusion of the field and Oliver's manifested expecta-
tion of privacy, the Court ruled that the search occurred in an open
field and that fourth amendment protections do not extend to such ar-
eas.7 ' The Court defined a reasonable expectation of privacy as turning
not on whether an individual intended to conceal ostensibly "private"
activities, but on whether the government's intrusion infringed upon
values protected by the fourth amendment.77 The Court listed several
factors to consider in determining whether society is willing to recog-
nize a privacy interest, including the Framers' intent, the ways in which
an individual has used an area, and whether the area is one that our
societal values promote as deserving the most scrupulous protection
from government intrusion.7 8 Based upon these factors, the Court de-
termined that individuals may not legitimately expect privacy during
outdoor activities conducted in fields, except in those areas that imme-
diately surround the home.79 Thus, even though Oliver may have exhib-
ited an expectation of privacy, his case failed the second prong of the
Katz test because society is not willing to recognize a privacy interest in
the open fields.
While ostensibly adhering to the Katz rationale, the Court argua-
bly decided Oliver in a manner inconsistent with Katz. Under a literal
application of the Katz test, the search should have been held unconsti-
tutional. The Katz Court stated that what a person intends to protect
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, is shielded by the
fourth amendment from unwarranted searches.8 0 The marijuana field in
Oliver was completely secluded from ground-level public observation.
Furthermore, entry to Oliver's property was clearly prohibited by
posted no-trespassing signs. By holding that the field was beyond the
protection of the fourth amendment, the Court created a per se excep-
73. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 174.
76. Id. at 176-80.
77. Id. at 182-83.
78. Id. at 178.
79. Id.
80. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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tion to the Katz analysis: as an irrebuttable presumption, open fields
are not protected, no matter how reasonable the person's expectation of
privacy. This exception turns solely on the nature of the property at
issue,"1 and is inconsistent with the Katz decision, which was designed
to prevent exactly this type of talismanic approach to construing the
fourth amendment.2
The Supreme Court further discussed the curtilage doctrine in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States. 3 In Dow Chemical the Environmental
Protection Agency hired a commercial aerial photographer to take pho-
tographs of Dow's two thousand acre chemical plant in Midland, Michi-
gan without first seeking a warrant.8 4 Flying at various lawful altitudes,
the photographer used a standard precision aerial mapping camera to
photograph the facility. 5 Dow claimed that the aerial photography was
an unconstitutional search because the fenced-in plant was adjacent to
and part of the Dow manufacturing facility and as such deserved the
same constitutional protection as the curtilage of a private home. 6
The Court disagreed with Dow's characterization of the area, find-
ing that an industrial complex spread over two thousand acres is not
analogous to the curtilage of a dwelling but is more like an open field.
8 7
Because the aircraft was flying at a lawful altitude when the pictures
were taken, the Court determined that the search was constitutionally
permissible. 8
As in Oliver, the Court applied a per se analysis, ignoring Dow's
clearly manifested intent to keep its property and activities private.
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Oliver that areas outside a home
and curtilage are not protected by the fourth amendment.89 The Court,
however, did not define the amount of privacy a person could reasona-
bly expect within the curtilage.
D. Ciraolo: Aerial Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
Ciraolo v. United States"0 was the Court's first ruling on the con-
stitutionality of an aerial surveillance of the curtilage of a private dwell-
81. See Comment, Affirmation of the Open Fields Doctrine: The Oliver Twist, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 729, 748 (1985).
82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
83. -476 U.S. 227 (1986).
84. Id. at 229.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 235.
87. Id. at 239.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 235-36.
90. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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ing. In Ciraolo the Santa Clara, California police department had
received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was cultivating marijuana in his
backyard. The yard was enclosed by two fences that completely ob-
structed view of the yard from ground level."1 To see Ciraolo's yard, the
investigating officers had to hire the owner of a private plane to fly
them over it.9 2 At an altitude of one thousand feet, the officers, who
were trained in marijuana detection, readily identified marijuana plants
growing in the enclosure.9 s Based upon these observations, the officers
obtained a search warrant and seized the marijuana.9 "
The California Court of Appeals held that the aerial observation
violated the fourth amendment.9 Citing Oliver, the court first held that
the marijuana garden was within the curtilage of Ciraolo's home.9 '
Next, the court held that the height and existence of the fences were
sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had manifested a reason-
able expectation of privacy within his yard.97 Because the flyover was
not part of a routine patrol, but rather a focused observation of
Ciraolo's house, the court held that the aerial observation was an inten-
tional and unauthorized invasion of the defendant's home and thus vio-
lated his constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."
The United States Supreme Court held that Ciraolo met the first
prong of the Katz test, but failed the second. The fences were a clear
indication to the Court that Ciraolo intended his activities within the
yard to remain private. Nevertheless, the Court held that the aerial sur-
veillance was not unconstitutional because society is not willing to rec-
ognize as reasonable Ciraolo's expectation that the curtilage would be
free from all observations. 9 The Court relied on United States v.
Knotts00 and Katz for the proposition that objects and activities ex-
posed to the plain view of outsiders do not receive protection under the
91. Id. at 209.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 209-10.
95. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984), rev'd 476
U.S. 207 (1986).
96. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
99. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
100. 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that police did not violate the respondents reasonable
expectation of privacy when they traced him with the aid of an electronic beeper, because the
device revealed nothing "that would not have been visible to the naked eye").
Based on language in Knotts, the Ciraolo Court concluded that "[tihe mere fact that an indi-
vidual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer's
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activi-
ties clearly visible." Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282).
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fourth amendment. Because the police were operating at a legal alti-
tude 011 and because anyone flying above Ciraolo's yard at that altitude
could look down into the yard, the Court held that Ciraolo had know-
ingly exposed the marijuana within the meaning of the plain view doc-
trine.1" 2 The fact that police observation was aimed specifically at
Ciraolo's yard was deemed to be irrelevant. 103
Writing in dissent, Justice Powell failed to see how the fact that
the police observations took place within public airspace could deprive
the curtilage of its constitutional protection.1 0 4 Justice Powell criticized
the majority for departing from the Katz analytical framework'05 and
noted that past decisions established that the inquiry "must often be
decided by 'reference to a place.' "106 Because Ciraolo's yard was within
the curtilage of his home, an area where expectations of privacy are
almost always legitimate, Justice Powell believed Ciraolo's expectation
of privacy was reasonable.10 7
Justice Powell also dismissed the majority's application of the plain
view doctrine. 08 Powell reasoned that privacy interests are not reduced
by business and private flights because travelers on such flights get at
most a fleeting, anonymous glimpse of the areas over which they fly. 0 9
By contrast, the police flight in this case focused on a particular loca-
tion.110 Justice Powell determined that society was not prepared to
force individuals to bear the risk of this sort of government intrusion
into their private living areas.
The Ciraolo standard for warrantless aerial surveillance turns ex-
clusively on the altitude of the overflight. As long as government offi-
cials fly over the property at a legal altitude, as defined by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), anything visible to the naked eye is ad-
missible as evidence. Proponents of this standard argue that it is consis-
101. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. "Legal altitude" refers to minimum flight altitudes as deter-
mined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(c) (1989). Navigable
airspace is defined as the space above the altitude limit set by regulation. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(29)
(1982).
102. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-15.
103. Id. at 213.
104. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 219.
106. Id. at 220 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
107. Id. Justice Powell reached this conclusion by linking together two previous holdings. In
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980), the Court held that a home is a place where expec-
tations of privacy virtually always will be legitimate. In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984), the Court stated that the curtilage is part of the home for fourth amendment purposes.
108. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 224.
110. Id. at 224-25.
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tent with the plain view doctrine. In addition, they claim that aerial
surveillance should not be prohibited as unconstitutional because it is
often the only method available to the police to detect illegal activity."'
Opponents argue that the Ciraolo standard ignores entirely the individ-
ual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. 1" 2 They also
contend that Katz was intended to prevent exactly this type of govern-
ment invasion, in which modern technology permits observation of ac-
tivity that would otherwise be private. 83 In the face of these criticisms,
Florida v. Riley"4 provided the Court with an opportunity to reconsider
the Ciraolo standard.
III. Florida v. Riley
A. Facts and Holding
Riley lived in a mobile home located on a five-acre tract of rural
property in Pasco County, Florida. 15 Ten to twenty feet behind the
mobile home, Riley maintained a greenhouse." 6 Only two sides of the
greenhouse were enclosed, but its contents were obscured from view at
ground level by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. 17 The roof of the
greenhouse consisted of translucent and opaque panels, but two of the
panels, amounting to approximately ten percent of the total roof area,
were missing. 118 The mobile home and greenhouse were surrounded by
a wire fence, and a "DO NOT ENTER" sign was posted at the entrance
to the property. 1' 9
The county sheriff's office received an anonymous tip that Riley
was growing marijuana on his property. 2 ° An officer was dispatched to
investigate the tip, but discovered that he could not see the contents of
the greenhouse from the public street adjacent to the property.'2 ' The
officer then obtained the use of a helicopter and circled twice over the
greenhouse at an altitude of approximately four hundred feet. 2 By
looking through the uncovered portion of the roof and the open sides of
111. See Smith, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: Searching for Constitutional Standards,
52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 257, 296 (1986).
112. See generally Note, supra note 2.
113. See generally Comment, supra note 58.
114. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989) (plurality decision).
115. Id. at 695 (plurality opinion).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id,
122. Id.
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the greenhouse, the officer spotted what he believed to be marijuana."'3
Based on his observations, the officer obtained a search warrant and
discovered marijuana growing in the greenhouse. 12 4 The United States
Supreme Court held that the officer's aerial surveillance of the green-
house did not violate the fourth amendment and ruled that the evi-
dence seized in the search was admissible.125
B. The Court's Analysis
Though the Court held that the evidence was admissible, only a
plurality of the Court agreed on the proper application of Ciraolo12 6 to
the facts.2 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but advocated
a different standard to be applied in cases involving aerial surveillance
of residential curtilages. 12 s Justices Brennan and Blackmun, writing
separately in dissent, agreed with Justice O'Connor's standard but not
her application of the standard to the facts. 2 9
The plurality agreed with the lower court that Ciraolo controlled
the instant case. 30 After finding that Riley met the first prong of the
Katz test,' 13 the plurality determined that he did not meet the second
prong.13 2 The plurality first cited Ciraolo for the proposition that the
curtilage is not protected from aerial observation by the government
when. the observation takes place from a legal altitude.13 The decision
noted that Riley involved observation from a helicopter rather than a
fixed wing aircraft but determined that this distinction was not signifi-
cant.13 4 The plurality also observed that private and commercial heli-
copter flights are routine in the public airspace of the United States
and that no evidence indicated that such flights should not be expected
in Pasco County, Florida. 35 Because the FAA had not set a minimum
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 697. The trial court granted Riley's motion to suppress the evidence as the fruit of
an unconstitutional search. See State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354, 1354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
The Florida District Court of Appeals reversed, but certified the case for review. Id. at 1356. On
certification, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial
court's suppression order. State v. Riley, 511 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1987).
126. Ciraolo v. United States, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
127. See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
130. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 695 (plurality opinion). Justice White authored the plurality opin-
ion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined in the opinion.
131. Id. at 696; cf. supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
132. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. "Legal altitude" in this discussion refers to "public airways" as defined by the FAA.
See supra note 101.
134. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 696 (plurality opinion).
135. Id.
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altitude for helicopter flight, the plurality determined that, under
Ciraolo, the officer's observation from the helicopter at four hundred
feet took place from a public vantage point.136 The officer was free to
observe anything that might be seen from that location.137 In addition,
because Riley left two sides of the structure and part of the roof open,
exposing the contents of the greenhouse to view from the air, the plu-
rality determined that Riley did not have an expectation of privacy that
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable."3 8
Justice O'Connor concurred that Riley's claim failed the second
prong of the Katz test, but disagreed with the plurality's application of
the Ciraolo standard. 3 9 Justice O'Connor believed that the plurality
erred by resting the scope of the fourth amendment too heavily on com-
pliance with FAA regulations, which were intended to promote air
safety rather than to protect the privacy interests that underlie the
amendment. 40 Under the plurality's standard, the only way to preserve
the privacy of the curtilage would be to enclose it completely,"4' which
would destroy the usefulness of the area. 42 Justice O'Connor argued
that the proper inquiry should not focus on whether the government
official was flying at a legal altitude, but on whether the government
official was flying over the property at an altitude regularly flown by the
public. 43 If the public regularly flies over the property, an individual's
expectation of privacy from aerial observation would not be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable under the plain view doc-
trine.14 4 Justice O'Connor placed the burden of proving the frequency
and altitude of public flights over the property on the defendant. 45 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that because the public regularly uses airspace
at four hundred feet and above and because Riley produced no evidence
to the contrary, Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance
was not reasonable.14 6
136. Id. at 696-97.
137. Id. The plurality noted that the only exception to this generality occurs when the sur-
veillance interferes with the normal use of the property. If the helicopter was operated in such a
manner as to kick up dust or create unduly loud noise, the search would not be permissible under
the fourth amendment. Id. at 697.
138. Id. at 696.
139. Id. at 697 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 698.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 698-99.
144. Id. at 698.
145. Id. at 699. For a discussion of the burden of proof, see infra notes 165-71 and accompa-
nying text.
146. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 699 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice O'Connor noted
that "public use of altitudes lower than that-particularly public observations from helicopters
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In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan reiterated that the plurality
had mistakenly focused on the position of the government observer and
had ignored entirely the frequency with which the public used the air-
space over Riley's curtilage. 47 Justice Brennan argued that the reason
the Katz Court determined that a person can have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in an area exposed to the public was that privacy in-
terests would be only slightly diminished by police surveillance of an
area that any passerby could readily see.148 Justice Brennan contended
that the plurality mistakenly interpreted Katz to mean that if even one
person could see into the curtilage without trespassing, the owner of the
curtilage could have no constitutionally protected reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the area.1 49 Justice Brennan strenuously disagreed
with this analysis and argued that holding Riley's privacy could poten-
tially be invaded from the skies was very different from holding that
society was not prepared to recognize Riley's expectation of privacy as
reasonable. 50 Using a sophisticated piece of machinery to view the
greenhouse, Justice Brennan argued, could not be likened to a police
officer standing on a public road viewing the greenhouse through a hole
in the fence.' 5 1
Justice Brennan contended that the correct analysis would be to
determine whether public observation of Riley's backyard was so com-
monplace that his expectation of privacy could not be considered rea-
sonable. 52 Contrary to Justice O'Connor, however, Justice Brennan
believed that the State should bear the burden of proving that public
flights at the altitude in question are not uncommon, rather than forc-
ing the defendant to prove the contrary, because the State has greater
access to flight pattern information. 153 Florida had not offered any evi-
dence to prove that helicopter flights at four hundred feet were com-
mon; therefore, Justice Brennan determined that Riley's fourth
circling over the curtilage of a home-may be sufficiently rare that police surveillance from such
altitudes would violate reasonable expectations of privacy, despite compliance with FAA air safety
regulations." Id. Justice O'Connor further averred that the police observations must be accom-
plished by the "naked eye." Id. She therefore would exclude observations enhanced by products of
modern technology.
147. Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Stevens joined in the dissent-
ing opinion.
148. Id. at 700.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 701. Justice Brennan wrote, "[t]o say that an invasion of Riley's privacy from the
skies was not impossible is most emphatically not the same as saying that his expectation of pri-
vacy within his enclosed curtilage was not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasona-
ble."' " Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 704 & n.7.
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amendment rights were violated.154
Justice Blackmun agreed with the standard set forth by Justices
O'Connor and Brennan, but offered a different criterion for determining
which party carries the burden of proving the frequency of public
flights at the relevant altitude. 155 Justice Blackmun rejected the appli-
cation of a per se rule that would place the burden of proof on either
party in all aerial surveillance cases. Instead, he suggested that the
State should carry the burden for all flights below one thousand feet
because flights at this altitude are generally rare.'56 Conversely, Justice
Blackmun felt that flights at altitudes over one thousand feet, or those
governed by Ciraolo, are sufficiently frequent that the defendant should
bear the burden of proof.L5 Because Florida would have borne the bur-
den of proof in the instant case and did not offer evidence to meet it,
Justice Blackmun would have held that the aerial surveillance at issue
was unconstitutional. 158
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Emerging Frequency Standard
The frequency standard enunciated by Justice O'Connor and the
four dissenting Justices represents an emerging majority within the
Court regarding the scope of the fourth amendment's protection of the
curtilage. This standard is superior to the plurality's analysis because it
adheres more closely to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
rationale.
The plurality asserted that because Riley had exposed a small sec-
tion of his greenhouse to the air, he had no constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy in it.'59 Although Katz did hold that the fourth
amendment does not protect areas knowingly exposed to the public,'60 a
person does not necessarily knowingly expose an area to the public
merely because it may be observed from an aircraft flying over it at a
legal altitude. Under the plurality's analysis, if a single pilot can some-
how maneuver an aircraft into position to see into the curtilage with the
naked eye, no matter how difficult it would be to do so, the person be-
ing observed has no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy. 16
154. Id. at 704.
155. Id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 705-06.
159. Id. at 696 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see supra notes 57-71 and accompany-
ing text.
161. Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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This analysis completely reads the term "reasonable" out of the Katz
standard. Fourth amendment protection should not hinge on the ab-
sence of any possibility that the curtilage can be observed, but rather
on whether the curtilage might reasonably be observed. If no one ever
flies over the property, the defendant cannot be said to have knowingly
exposed his activities to plain view. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor cor-
rectly pointed out that under the plurality's analysis, the curtilage will
not be protected from government intrusion unless it is completely en-
closed. 162 Such a requirement totally frustrates the usefulness and en-
joyment of maintaining an outdoor patio or yard. In addition, it ignores
one hundred years of jurisprudence that has recognized the curtilage as
an important extension of the home in which intimate activities are
conducted.'13
The frequency standard preserves the "reasonableness" element of
the Katz test because the linchpin of this analysis is the frequency of
nongovernment flights at the altitude in question. The requirement
that the frequency determination be made with reference only to
nonpolice flights is significant. If the standard were determined by the
frequency of government flights, the government could eliminate all ex-
pectations of privacy through routine patrols every possible altitude.
Also significant is the fact that the frequency determination is made
with reference only to flights over the defendant's property.1 6 4 If the
defendant lives in a rural area, several miles from any airport or heli-
port, it is unlikely that the public regularly will fly over his or her prop-
erty at altitudes low enough to observe the activities being conducted
by the defendant with the naked eye. On those facts, the defendant's
expectation of freedom from aerial observation cannot be said to be
unreasonable.
The frequency standard is a step in the right direction but it falls
short of providing a general standard that adequately recognizes when a
person's expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance is reasonable.
The frequency standard does not take into account flight pattern infor-
mation or the manner of the aerial observation. Flight pattern informa-
tion is significant in determining reasonable expectations of privacy
because aircraft may fly regularly over residential property but only on
specific flight paths. For example, an individual living near an airport
can expect aircraft to fly over or near his or her property on a regular
162. Id. at 698 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. See supra notes 35-113 and accompanying text.
164. In articulating this part of the "frequency" standard, Justice O'Connor noted that it is
not "conclusive that police helicopters may often fly at 400 feet. If the public rarely, if ever, travels
overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally
used by the public. . . ." Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 698-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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basis. If the airport has only a limited number of takeoff and landing
patterns from its runways, the individual may be able to build a struc-
ture that shields the curtilage from the observation of planes flying on
these patterns. Unless the structure completely encloses the property,
however, it will not conceal the property from planes flying on different
flight patterns. Under a strict application of the frequency standard,
the individual's expectation of privacy will not be constitutionally pro-
tected because, even though regular flights over the property cannot see
inside the shelter, a plane flying at a different flight angle could observe
the property. The Katz reasonableness test was not intended to permit
such an incongruous result. Because the individual took steps to protect
the property and because public aircraft do not fly regularly over the
property at an angle that would allow observation of the curtilage, the
individual's expectation of privacy should be recognized as reasonable.
The frequency standard also does not address adequately the man-
ner of the police surveillance. The public may fly regularly over prop-
erty, but if the manner in which the police use an aircraft to observe
the property is not consistent with the manner in which the public typi-
cally flies over the property, the owner's expectation of privacy should
not be dismissed as unreasonable. The helicopter, with its unique abil-
ity to hover and execute extensive maneuvers in a confined space,
serves as a good illustration. Even if helicopters operate regularly in an
area, generic helicopter flights over an urban neighborhood are quite
different from a helicopter hovering over a particular parcel of land,
carefully inspecting it from various angles. A helicopter flying over a
backyard catches only a brief glimpse of its contents, whereas a helicop-
ter hovering over the yard can observe freely everything that is not
completely enclosed. Public use of helicopters to scrutinize private resi-
dences is certainly rare, but the frequency standard would permit such
highly intrusive surveillance by the police as long as public helicopters
operate regularly in the area in any manner.16 5
A proper analysis for determining whether the fourth amendment
protects a residential curtilage from unwarranted aerial surveillance
should take into account four factors: (1) the altitude of the overflight;
(2) the frequency of public flights over the property; (3) the flight pat-
terns used by the public when flying over the property; and (4) the
manner in which the aircraft is used to observe the property in compar-
165. Riley illustrates this problem. The police had to fly over Riley's greenhouse twice before
they could gain an adequate glimpse of its contents. Id. at 693. Even if Justice O'Connor was
correct that public helicopter use is not rare at 400 feet, the frequency standard she applied to
determine the reasonableness of Riley's expectation may have produced an incorrect result because
it is highly unlikely that members of the public regularly use helicopters to hover over residential
property.
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ison to the manner in which the public generally flies over the property.
This standard requires greater scrutiny into the reasonableness of the
government's aerial surveillance and thus better protects reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy.
B. The Burden of Proof
Although Justice O'Connor and the four dissenting Justices
adopted the same standard for determining the reasonableness of pri-
vacy expectations in aerial surveillance cases, they disagreed as to
which party should bear the burden of proof regarding the frequency of
public flights over the observed property. Justice O'Connor contended
that the defendant should bear the burden of proof,6 6 but Justice
Brennan contended that the State should bear it. 167 Justice Blackmun
contended that the State should bear the burden of proof for any heli-
copter surveillance conducted below one thousand feet, or those cases
not covered by Ciraolo, and the defendant should bear it for any aerial
surveillance conducted at an altitude greater than one thousand feet. 68
Resolution of this issue may determine whether the Justices join to-
gether in the future to adopt the frequency standard.
Justice Brennan's allocation of the burden of proof appears to be
the most sound in declaring that the State should shoulder the burden
of proof. As stated by Justice Brennan, the State has greater access to
information concerning regular flight patterns and altitudes 16  and
therefore is in a better position to provide proof. Justice Blackmun's
approach, though original, places too much emphasis on the altitude of
the flight. 7 ° The fact that the aerial surveillance at one thousand feet
in Ciraolo was constitutionally permissible has no logical significance
with regard to determining which party should bear the burden of
proof. If the burden of proof was assigned to the parties in this fashion,
every time the FAA revised its minimum altitude regulations, the bur-
dens of proof would change. 1 17 Regardless of whether the court resolves
the burden of proof question uniformly, the clear message to prospec-
tive litigants is that evidence about the frequency of public flights is
now an essential factor in the Court's analysis of the scope of fourth
166. Id. at 699.
167. Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
171. The warrantless aerial surveillance in Ciraolo was constitutionally permissible because
the plane was operating at 1000 feet in an area where the minimum flight altitude was 500 feet.
See supra note 101. If the FAA revised its regulations to set the minimum flight altitude at 1500
feet, the surveillance in Ciraolo would no longer be constitutionally permissible and Blackmun's
assignment of the burdens of proof would have to be revised.
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amendment protection afforded residential curtilages.
V. CONCLUSION
The curtilage has evolved from a sanctuary deserving the same con-
stitutional protection as that afforded the home to its current status as
little more than a buzzword holding no actual legal significance. 172
Under the Court's holdings in Ciraolo and Riley, no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy inheres in the curtilage unless it is completely shrouded
from view. These decisions raise questions of whether society is pre-
pared to adopt such a limited view of the privacy that can be expected
in such areas. Although the Riley plurality's opinion perhaps evinces
images of an Orwellian Big Brother state,' the positions taken by Jus-
tice O'Connor and the four dissenting Justices offers hope that future
fourth amendment jurisprudence may not evolve in that direction.
Their opinions suggest that the Court may be shifting away from blind
concentration on the apprehension of criminals and back to a more rea-
soned approach that emphasizes an individual's right to privacy in his
home and curtilage.
David J. Stewart
172. See Note, California v. Ciraolo: Blanketing the Curtilage, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 247, 261
(1987).
173. In concluding his dissent, Justice Brennan offered the following excerpt as a response to
the direction the Court took in Ciraolo and Riley regarding the permissibility of warrantless aerial
surveillances:
"The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was one on
the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption
said .... In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an
instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol,
snooping into people's windows."
Riley, 109 S. Ct. at 705 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting G. ORWELL, NINETEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4
(1949)).
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